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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock and Scott Dullea 
 
Bureaucratic/administrative reorganization ahead 
In addition to the recent changes that have expanded FSB power to near-Soviet 
levels (see Security Services section for details), many expect further decrees 
affecting economic conglomerates. (THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 18 Mar 03; 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Other reforms are anticipated in the 
administration. 
 
By reducing overlapping agencies, Putin may not be attempting merely to make 
the notoriously inefficient Russian government less wasteful, but to advance the 
careers of individuals he favors, and to sideline opponents. His recent 
appointment of Valentina Matvienko to the post of plenipotentiary representative 
in the Northwest Federal District (NFD) may be a case in point. (ITAR-TASS, 11 
Mar 03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The NFD is an important region, 
containing the city of St. Petersburg. While the posting opened up following 
administrative reform, it can provide a useful launchpad should she make a run 
for the governorship. 
 
According to the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mikhail Kasyanov, several 
agencies are expected to undergo changes in the coming months, including the 
ministries of communications, railways, press transport/industry, and 
science/technology. Kasyanov, not a member of Putin’s exclusive St. Petersburg 
group but powerful nonetheless, no doubt will be looking for ways to increase his 
own influence by means of administrative changes. 
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Kasyanov’s role in the process can be explained in one of two ways: either Putin 
and Kasyanov have come to an agreement on which spheres they will dominate 
(Putin controlling the "power" ministries, while Kasyanov handles the domestic 
economy), or Kasyanov is making a play for increased bureaucratic power. The 
fact that Matvienko was one of Kasyanov’s deputies may be significant. It is more 
likely that Putin and Kasyanov are squabbling over pieces of the pie than 
carefully dividing it up. 
 
There has been speculation that Putin may not exercise as much control as he 
would like. Some newspapers assert that Putin’s "power" allies are pressing for 
concessions at the expense of the oligarchs. (WPS, 12 Mar 03; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
Putin’s appointees: What are friends for? 
An old Russian proverb says "one's own earring to one's dear friend." Indeed 
Vladimir Putin has given away many "earrings" during his term in office. In fact, 
the president has surrounded himself with many dear friends, and these 
appointees comprise an important element of the Putin cult. This month Putin 
continued to bolster that cult through a reamalgamation of security service 
agencies and reshuffling of their leaders, continuing the practice of gaining 
control through dependable friends that he began immediately upon taking office. 
 
When he served as acting president, 40 percent of Putin’s highest officeholders 
were former KGB/FSB officers, 10 out of his 24 appointees having a secret police 
background. (RUSSIA REFORM MONITOR, 7 Feb 00) While this seemed logical 
to some, considering the president’s own background and the priority his 
administration placed on dealing with Russian organized crime, some began to 
fear the return of the KGB and authoritarian rule. (PERSPECTIVE, Mar-Apr 00) 
 
Such fears were not assuaged by the president’s subsequent actions. Asserting 
the Kremlin’s influence over the vast Russian countryside, in the spring of 2000, 
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Putin appointed seven so-called "superbosses" (officially, plenipotentiary 
representatives of the Russian president) to oversee the new federal super-
districts, specifically the work of all the federal agencies in their respective 
regions. Of the original seven "superboss" appointees, two were army 
commanders, a third was a Ministry of the Interior (MVD) police chief and two, 
like Putin, were from the FSB. (BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, 5 Jun 00) Moreover, 
administrators are not the only individuals serving as Moscow’s "eyes" and "ears" 
in the regions. Kremlin-appointed judges also endeavor to ensure that Putin’s 
policies are implemented. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 5 Mar 03) Some view these 
appointments and the creation of these positions as unconstitutional. (ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, 21 Mar 03) 
 
The latest reamalgamation of the security ministries are causing renewed 
concern over a return to a Soviet-style KGB structure. The moves give the 
Federal Security Service (FSB) control over two other KGB successor agencies: 
the Border Guards and (sharing control with the defense ministry) the functions 
of the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information 
(FAPSI), which itself was disbanded. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 11 Mar 03; via 
Johnson’s Russia List) Leaders, as well as agencies, were reshuffled, including 
the appointment of Viktor Vasilievich Cherkesov to head the new state 
Committee on Drug Trafficking. 
 
Cherkesov does not appear overwhelmingly qualified for his new position; 
however, he and Putin studied law together at Leningrad State University. 
Cherkosov, like Putin, is a veteran of the KGB and FSB, having served as the 
first deputy director of the latter. More recently Cherkesov served as the 
"superboss" of the Northwestern district. Putin had appointed him to that position 
in May 2000 supposedly to quash Putin’s longtime rival, Vladimir Yakovlev, 
governor of St. Petersburg. (BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, 5 Jun 00) 
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However, it is Cherkesov’s less recent past that worries many. In the 1980s he 
reportedly headed the KGB’s Fifth Chief Directorate with the responsibility for 
surveillance of the media, church, schools and trade unions. Dissidents who 
were victims of Cherkesov’s witch hunts of that period describe him in sinister 
terms. These victims and other critics express concern about the possibility of 
Cherkesov’s rise to power. (THE SUNDAY TIMES (London), 2 Apr 00) 
 
Cherkesov’s latest appointment could be a reward for his success as Putin’s 
envoy in the Northwest Federal District, where he effectively prevented Yakovlev 
from seeking a third term as St. Petersburg governor by assembling an anti-
Yakovlev coalition in the city’s legislative assembly. In his new position 
Cherkesov will have a staff of 40,000 persons, including regional-level and 
Moscow-based officials. (RFE/RL RUSSIAN POLITICAL WEEKLY, 13 Mar 03) 
Indeed, it is possible that this appointment is only temporary and that, once in 
Moscow, Cherkesov, who worked on Putin’s presidential campaign staff, will 
receive an even more serious political promotion. (ROSBALT NEWS AGENCY, 
14 Mar 03) 
 
Critics point out that Putin’s appointment of Cherkesov, and others, could harm 
Russia’s chances for improving the current social, political and economic 
situation. They claim the appointees’ competency and corruptibility are 
secondary to their personal relationship with Putin, and that the very loyalty 
which may seem attractive to the president is, in fact, hazardous to the rule of 
law. (TVS, 13 Mar 03; BBC Monitoring, via Johnson’s Russia List) 
 
This appears to be Putin’s style — appoint loyal friends to lead agencies rather 
than reform them, hence the creation of the regional superbosses and the 
appointment of (former FSB colleague) Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov as well 
as this latest round of agency reshuffling and accompanying appointments. And, 
unlike Boris Yel’tsin, who focused on controlling the business "magnates," 
President Putin maintains his supervision of business by installing his trusted 
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followers in the leadership of the big five "power" ministries. (YEZHENEDENYI 
ZHURNAL, 19 Mar 03; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) So which option is more dangerous: the rebirth of the KGB, or a 
Russia led by incompetent, dangerous, but loyal puppets? Neither sounds 
promising to a country in need of leadership and concrete reforms, but what are 
friends for? 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Scott Fleeher 
 
Back to the Future… 
As world attention focused on the prelude to the conflict in Iraq, President 
Vladimir Putin availed himself of the opportunity to shore up yet another healthy 
dose of power at home. With a series of presidential decrees, Putin has 
significantly strengthened his own service (FSB). 
 
Under the reorganization, the Federal Tax Police Service (FSNP) was abolished, 
with its responsibilities being transferred to the MVD. (RFE/RL RUSSIAN 
FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY WATCH, 11 Mar 03) The decrees also 
abolished the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information 
(FAPSI), along with the Federal Border Guard Service (FSP). Both of these 
agencies will now fall directly under the Federal Security Service (FSB). Posting 
of both the FAPSI and FSP under the direct control of the FSB marks a return to 
an organizational structure strikingly similar to that of the Soviet-era KGB. (THE 
WASHINGTON POST, 12 Mar 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Without question, Putin's decrees moved the already powerful FSB even further 
toward the status of a "super agency." In comments to the Moscow Times, 
Alexander Pikaev, a defense and security analyst with the Moscow Carnegie 
Center, said that, other than controlling the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) 
 6 
and Federal Guard Service, the FSB was close to being "back on par" with its 
predecessor the KGB. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 12 Mar 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
As part of the reorganization, the already dominant FSB will assume control of 
more than 150,000 Border Guards and their associated equipment, including 
thousands of artillery pieces, armored vehicles, patrol boats and aircraft. This 
complement of personnel and equipment will give the FSB additional intelligence-
gathering capabilities, allowing operations well outside the country's borders. 
(THE MOSCOW TIMES, 12 Mar 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Predictably, the recent security service shake-up drew mostly praise from within, 
along with considerable scrutiny and apprehension from outside observers. 
 
A number of Russian officials lauded the consolidation, making nonanalogous 
comparisons with American attempts to strengthen national security. In a strong 
vote of support, Nikolai Kovalev, former FSB director from 1996 to 1998, 
commented: "This is a very logical decision of our president. I think we all 
understand very well…how much our country needs a strong security service." 
(THE WASHINGTON POST, 12 Mar 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Lyudmila Alexeeva, a Soviet-era dissident and head of the Moscow Helsinki 
Group, was less sanguine in her assessment of the recent changes. Addressing 
the reorganization, she said "They are recreating the same old monster…It will 
definitely have a negative impact on civil society." (THE GUARDIAN, 12 Mar 03; 
via Lexis-Nexis) Voicing further concern regarding the consolidation, independent 
defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer added, "In a normal country, border guards 
are never part of the special services…They were part of the KGB in Soviet times 
to isolate the country from the rest of the world." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 
11 Mar 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
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This recent expansion of the FSB is certain to strengthen Putin's power base; 
however, it remains to be seen if the restructuring will have any positive impact 
on the ham-handed antics of the increasingly dominant agency in which the 
president once served. 
 
Alpha less than pleased 
Six months subsequent to its catastrophic and still mysterious ending, the 
October 2002 Nord-Ost hostage saga continues to demand attention. In a letter 
to the president, unidentified officers of the elite antiterrorism force Alpha 
expressed their dissatisfaction with Putin's recent awarding of the Hero of Russia 
award to two top FSB generals. The officers allege that Putin secretly awarded 
the state honor to five individuals associated with the hostage crisis earlier this 
year. In addition to the two FSB recipients, the award was also given to an officer 
from Alpha, another from Vympel, along with a "chemical specialist" who 
administered the lethal gas into the theater. (RFE/RL RUSSIAN FOREIGN 
POLICY AND SECURITY WATCH, 11 Mar 03) 
 
In their remarks to Putin, the dissatisfied members of Alpha commented, "The 
First Deputy FSB Director Vladimir Pronichev, and the head of the FSB Special 
Operations Center, General Aleksandr Tikhonov, should have been disciplined 
for allowing the Chechen fighters to penetrate the center of Moscow and take 
more than 800 theatre goers hostage, but instead they were given awards that 
should rightly have gone to men who risked their lives to save the hostages." 
Such remarks indicate that in addition to the predictable range of challenges that 
is certain to arise following the recent KGB-ization of the Russian security 
apparatus, dissent regarding the happenings at Nord-Ost may not fade as far 
from view as many would like. 
 
Why so many secrets? 
The correspondence from Putin's colleagues at Alpha surfaced around the same 
time Novaya gazeta published some noteworthy statistics regarding awards 
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given for service during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and more recent 
operations in Chechnya. According to the report, a mere 58 Hero of the Soviet 
Union Awards were presented during the entire nine-year Soviet conflict with 
Afghanistan. (RFE/RL RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY WATCH, 
11 Mar 03) Information provided by the Association of Heroes of the Soviet Union 
and Russia indicates that Hero of Russia awards presented in connection with 
operations in Chechnya are considered state secrets, with an estimated 90% of 
these being awarded posthumously. (RFE/RL RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
AND SECURITY WATCH, 11 Mar 03) If Russia's "war on terror" in Chechnya 
merits legitimacy in the eyes of the world, why then do heroes slain in the conflict 
not merit the same public recognition afforded high-level FSB officials, Alpha 
officers, and "chemical specialists"? 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Ansel Stein 
 
With friends like these who needs enemies? 
In addition to Russia’s continued diplomatic campaign against the United States, 
Washington made public on Sunday, 23 March, a long-standing complaint that 
Russian companies have been supplying Iraq with military hardware and 
advisors in breach of UN sanctions. This revelation should not come as a 
surprise to any devoted NIS Observed reader. 
 
Specifically, the US has learned that technicians from a Moscow-based 
company, Aviakonversiya, are currently in Baghdad teaching Iraqi specialists 
how to use portable jamming units which are capable of scrambling the GPS 
signals used to locate the targets for most US precision-guided munitions. Two 
other Russian companies are suspected of recently providing to Iraq militarily 
significant numbers of wire-guided Kornet antitank missiles, and thousands of 
night-vision goggles. Russian experts say all three companies named in the US 
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complaint do brisk export business, with customers that include the United Arab 
Emirates, Syria, Jordan, and India. While Aviakonversiya's director, Oleg 
Antonov, dismissed the American complaint as "nonsense," he went on to add 
that Iraq "might have constructed such devices itself or purchased them from a 
third company." (THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 26 Mar 03; via Lexis-
Nexis) 
 
In addition to this revelation, the Russian media are reporting that Russian 
military intelligence (GRU) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) stations in 
Iraq have been on special alert status since the onset of military actions against 
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Nezavisimaya gazeta reported on 21 March that the 
stations have been issuing bulletins to Russia’s political leadership on a constant, 
rolling basis. Russia’s intelligence agencies also have activated their resources 
globally in order to monitor the military operation, the international situation, and 
US and British plans for post-Hussein Iraq. TVS on 20 March quoted Igor 
Morozov, a former Soviet foreign intelligence officer in Baghdad during the 
1980s, as saying that Russia has very powerful intelligence assets in Iraq, 
including within its military commands, its political leadership, and its security 
services. This implies that Russian "technicians" may be doing more than simply 
teaching the Iraqis how to use the equipment. 
 
The senior US official quoted in the Washington Post article that broke the story 
said that US intelligence had been able to match an electronic signal emitted by 
the system in Iraq specifically to the system sold by Aviakonversiya. The official 
also confirmed that complaints about the sales of jamming devices by the firm 
had begun in June 2002. At the time the Russians denied that the company even 
existed, despite the fact that it maintained an Internet site and was the subject of 
extensive media coverage in Russia. "It was ridiculous, but now it's gone beyond 
that," the official said. "It is grotesque." (Agence France-Presse, 24 Mar 03; via 
Lexis-Nexis) 
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Despite telephone calls from President Bush and Colin Powell to their Russian 
counterparts, Moscow has refused even to acknowledge a problem. "Russia 
strictly observes its international obligations," said Igor Ivanov, on Russian 
television. "It did not sell any equipment, including military equipment, in 
violation" of sanctions. (The New York Times, 24 Mar 03) No doubt further proof 
acquired in the liberation of Iraq will be met with similar denials. The real question 
is not how Russia would react to such evidence, it is whether there will be a 
realization that Putin and his entourage may not be precisely "allies." 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
Tell it to the judge 
Could the Russian government be getting soft on crime? Analysts with an eye on 
history may be startled to learn that Vladimir Putin seems to be aiming for a 
kinder, gentler nation, at least for petty criminals without government IDs. For all 
others committing crimes, however, the story is a bit different. 
 
One indication that the former FSB agent-cum-president may have a gooey 
middle came with his submission of more than 50 amendments that would reform 
the criminal code and change the punishment for some minor crimes from 
imprisonment to fines. While deputy chief of staff Dmitri Kozak was quick to point 
out that the presidential amendments do not envisage amnesty for convicted 
criminals, he described the current criminal code as a "rudiment of criminal 
legislation of the last century’s totalitarian state." Younger criminals also should 
benefit, as courts would be given greater discretion when dealing with minors. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1610 GMT, 11 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0311, via World News 
Connection) 
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The situation also has improved for female criminals. According to the justice 
ministry’s penitentiary directorate, 8,000 of the country’s 50,000 female prisoners 
were amnestied in 2001. Directorate head Sergei Boltkov explained that the 
department "is seeking to humanize imprisonment." In fact, he said, a "social 
assistance service for prisoners has been operating since last year," including 
the housing of 526 children in special homes at women’s prisons. (ITAR-TASS, 
1518 GMT, 8 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0308, via World News Connection) 
 
Yet not all scofflaws can throw themselves on the court’s mercy. Indeed, if a 
member of the Duma legislation committee has her way, the state will be getting 
tougher on individuals who believe they’re not committing crimes at all (but 
perhaps they should know better). MP Yelena Mizulina and the working group 
she leads recommended last month that individuals trafficking in other individuals 
should be prosecuted. "Such grave crimes as trade in humans for the use of their 
organs in transplants, for forcing mothers to become surrogate mothers or for 
exploiting people as slaves are not punishable by law in this country. Our bill 
envisions exhaustive and differentiated liability for such crimes," Mizulina said. 
The bill was drafted with help from the international community, including the 
United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the 
American Bar Association. (Interfax, 1540 GMT, 17 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0217, via World News Connection) 
 
Government officials also will need to start looking over their shoulders. In 
addition to continued discussions of the proposed legislation "On Combating 
Corruption," which is bound to affect a large number of administrators, the Duma 
recently held the first reading (and approved) amendments to the criminal code 
establishing punishment for officials who are responsible for the use of torture in 
the course of their official duties. (ITAR-TASS, 1259 GMT, 19 Mar 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0319, via World News Connection) 
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REGIONS 
Passing the buck 
Proposed governmental reform purportedly will include the transfer of some 
areas of responsibility to the regions. Yet, funding for those areas remains a 
sticky issue. Earlier this month, Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov 
assured officials in the Yaroslavl region that, beginning in 2004, half of the tax 
collected locally will remain in the region. (ITAR-TASS, 1246 GMT, 5 Mar 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0305, via World News Connection) 
 
Not only administrators needed that assurance. Strikes by medical and 
educational personnel demanding wage raises, as well as payment of back 
wages, were held in many regions across the country. Workers voiced concern 
over the nonpayment of wages, and saw no reason to cheer proposals that 
would move the already unmet burden to local shoulders. The Kamchatka unions 
of medics and educators warned that such a change would lead to a crisis in 
public education, health, science and culture. A similar group from Yuzhno-
Sakalinsk sent a telegram to Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov noting its 
displeasure with the proposed shift of wage responsibility to regional and 
municipal budgets. (ITAR-TASS, 1239 GMT, 27 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0227, 
via World News Connection) Given that many regions grew dark and cold this 
winter as utility bills remained unpaid, the workers’ concern is completely 
understandable. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Steve Kwast and Dan Rozelle 
 
Housing crisis threatens overall military reform 
The Russian military has not provided adequate housing for its troops. The 
problem is so large, and the solution so expensive, that fixing the root cause 
could prevent any hope of reforming the military overall and bringing it up to 
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modern standards. Currently over 200,000 military personnel do not have 
housing, according to a report recently presented to the State Duma. (ITAR-
TASS, 1537 GMT, 10 Feb 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The Russian government tried to tackle this problem in 1997 with a targeted 
program called the "State Housing Certificate" (GZhS). Its goal was to put a roof 
over 210,000 needy military officers by 2002. The program was designed to 
provide officers without housing a certificate that would cover up to 80 percent of 
the average "statistical price" of an apartment. However, the statistical price 
dictated by the military was too low. Additionally, the military officers didn’t have 
any extra spending money to pay the remaining 20 percent of the rent. 
 
Last month the program ended with discouraging results. Only about half of the 
60 billion rubles needed to finance the program actually got through to military 
officers. The head of the Joint Directorate for Investment Program 
Implementation of Russia, Anatoly Mishanov, said the program will be extended 
until 2003 with three important changes: 100 percent of the housing cost (instead 
of 80 percent) will be funded; the time allowed for military members to apply for 
the program will be expanded; and limits on cost per square meter of housing 
(based on the local economy) will be lifted. Additionally, Mishanov announced 
that the ministries of economic development, trade, finance and defense together 
will draw up a new targeted program to ensure servicemen receive adequate 
housing through 2010. (TRUD, 8 Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0210, via World News 
Connection) 
 
It’s hard to know how soon such a new program can meet immediate needs. 
Currently 6,000 officers of the Siberian Military District do not have housing. 
According to district commander Col-Gen Nikolay Makarov, "This social problem 
is one of [the] most acute for military units deployed in the dangerous climatic 
conditions of Siberia." (FINANCIAL TIMES, 11 Feb 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
Additionally, an officer currently must wait six to seven years to get an apartment. 
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(VREMYA, 28 Feb 03; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Attitudes among the young officers, understandably, are skeptical. "In my 
opinion, all these [generals who run the programs] have arrived from another 
planet. They do not know how the army lives and see only what they want to see. 
God knows what they report to the leadership," one officer said. Another officer 
compared his situation to the proposed plight of others: "I do not understand why 
a contract serviceman must receive more than I do and live in an apartment. I 
have served for nine years, and do not have housing. Every day I come to the 
regiment at 8:00 a.m. and go home at 10:00 p.m. Contract servicemen will work 
from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and will have two days-off." (ROSSIYA, 28 Feb 03; 
WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) President 
Putin, however, continues to encourage military officers in the face of these grim 
realities. Meeting with junior officers last month, Putin said, "If utilities and 
housing bills make up more than 20 percent of a family’s total income, then the 
serviceman has the right to ask for a compensation of any costs exceeding the 
20 percent of his family’s income. Everybody must be aware of that and must 
take advantage of this benefit." (CHANNEL ONE TV, 1200 GMT, 21 Feb 03; 
WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The current disaster with the management and implementation of the GZhs 
program is a subject for Russia’s auditing and law enforcement structures. The 
general military prosecutor’s office says that investigators will soon charge high-
ranking generals in some central departments of the defense ministry with 
financial misconduct uncovered by the State Auditing Commission in 2002. 
Housing programs are the first priority. In their initial report, investigators found 
that only 31 percent of ministry-owned apartments have been passed over to 
servicemen and their families. The overwhelming majority of these apartments 
are occupied by civilians who have bribed their way into the system and 
purchased these apartments from corrupt officials. The State Auditing 
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Commission also says that the government and the defense ministry can account 
for only 32 percent of the money provided to fix the housing problem. 
(OBSERVER, 21 Feb 03; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
The Duma opened hearings recently about this issue. Deputy chairman of the 
State Duma, Petr Ramanov, proposed that private construction companies could 
lend large tracts of land to the military in return for the contracts to build housing 
for the servicemen. The president of the interregional association of builders, 
Nikolay Karasev, said that his organization could double the amount of housing 
being built for service personnel under such a plan. (ITAR-TASS, 1537 GMT, 10 
Feb 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0210, via World News Connection) 
 
President Putin and his administration have noted their displeasure with the 
absence of progress on military reform. The housing issue is a perfect example. 
Russia’s first "civilian" defense minister, Sergey Ivanov (actually an FSB officer), 
was appointed two years ago and charged with kick-starting the military reform; 
he seems to have failed the task. Radical changes in the military leadership may 
begin in the middle of March. Sergey Ivanov may be moved to another post and 
be replaced either with Andrey Nikolaev, chairman of the State Duma and former 
commander of the Border Troops, Vladislav Putilin, deputy minister of Economic 
Development, or Valentin Bobryshev, commander-in-chief of the Leningrad 
military district. Even more interesting will be the question whom Putin replaces 
as chief of the General Staff. Currently, General Anatoly Kvashnin is known to be 
the main "silent opponent" of army reform and of much-needed changes 
throughout the armed forces. Possible replacements include the chief of the 
General Staff’s Main Intelligence Department (GRU), Valentin Korabelnikov, or 
the deputy foreign minister (and former chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service), 
Vyacheslav Trubnikov. (VREMYA, 11 Feb 03; via Lexis-Nexis) In the final 
analysis, Moscow’s inability to supply its servicemen with the basic need of 
housing is indicative of its inability to function as a military. 
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The housing issue could become the largest single roadblock to military reform 
because it will require so much money to fix. Additionally, officers in the military 
will not work hard for reform if their leadership isn’t even willing to provide 
adequate housing. Until Moscow can fix the small problems, like housing, it will 
be unable to fix the large problems of modernization. 
 
Funding woes continue to mount for Russia's military 
New army officers receiving only a single field uniform, air force pilots tallying 
only 23 hours of flight time per year on average, exercises without the use of 
weapons and hardware — what's going on with Russia's military? All of these 
issues presently are affecting Russia's armed forces due to a lack of funding; 
moreover, despite promises of additional money, it appears that this may 
become a normal course of existence. 
 
Information leaked from the office of the defense minister's financial advisor 
indicates that the budget for supply and logistics organizations will constitute only 
50% of the amounts required. For example, transportation services and Central 
Food Department are set to receive 60% and 76%, respectively, of the funding 
needed for expenditures. Only one-third of the requested funds for military 
medicine will be allocated, while the Central Clothing Department will receive 
only 20%. It is this last cutback that could have the greatest impact on the troops. 
Officers provided with only a single uniform will find it difficult to combine dirty 
field operations with any formal parade or inspection functions. (VREMYA 
NOVOSTEI, 27 Feb 03; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security 
Database) 
 
The air force hasn't been immune to the cutbacks either. According to a defense 
ministry commission that inspected long-range aviation units, it is possible that 
the units will face serious troubles in a few years. A lack of funding for fuel is 
preventing young pilots from gaining the necessary training and experience to 
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operate their aircraft and its weapons competently. "Pilots are becoming old. 
Experienced pilots are over 40 years old," one inspector said. "We do not have 
enough time to train a younger generation of pilots.… At present we have a few 
experienced pilots who can launch missiles or refuel bombers in the air. They 
must teach the younger pilots. The problem is that long-range aviation does not 
have enough kerosene…." Other military sources, however, tried to emphasize 
positive aspects of the training, saying that pilots averaged 23 hours of flight time 
in all of 2002 compared to just eight hours in 2000. (US pilots by comparison 
generally fly between 15 and 25 hours each month depending on the type of 
aircraft.) (IZVESTIA, 9 Feb 03; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and 
Security Database) 
 
Lest one believe that the only effect of an aviation fuel shortage for Russia's air 
force is limited training, it must be noted that 32 aircraft accidents have killed 44 
crew members and 111 passengers since January 2000. In addition, 31 aircraft 
and 21 helicopters were damaged due to accidents in the same time period. The 
air force is not alone in experiencing aviation accidents. The aviation branches of 
the three security services have experienced 969 air accidents since January 
2000 (not including army losses in Chechnya). 
 
At least half of all these accidents are directly attributable to human factors linked 
to a lack of available flight time and associated training. Another factor is airframe 
fatigue. For example, many of Russia's helicopters average 15-20 years in age. 
Other reasons can be traced to poor maintenance of aging aircraft and severely 
outdated ground communication and navigation systems. The poor condition of 
runways also contributes to the high rate of accidents. Some specialists are 
saying that, unless improvements are made, the Russian air force will pose a 
threat to Russia itself by 2010, killing not only pilots and passengers but the 
residents of towns and villages. Others believe that at the present rate of attrition, 
Russia's air force will cease to exist by 2010 unless money is made available to 
purchase replacement aircraft for those lost. (NEZAVISIMOE VOENNOE 
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OBOZRENIE, 14-20 Feb 03; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security 
Database) 
 
The fuel shortages are not just limited to the air forces. In a recent interview, the 
head of training for the Baltic Fleet's ground troops, Vladimir Makarov, stated that 
recent combat exercises were conducted without either weapons or other 
equipment due to lack of fuel. "The circumstance does not make it possible to 
use weapons and military hardware in exercises," he said. "We had to simplify 
the training process owing to this cause." (STRAZH BALTIKI, 28 Jan 03; What 
the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
 
Russia hopes to prevent Kazakhstan's Caspian navy 
The announcement by Kazakhstan of its plan to establish a navy drew an 
immediate negative response from Russia. "Russia does not approve of 
Kazakhstan's intention to create its own navy in the Caspian Sea," said Russia's 
special envoy for Caspian issues, Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Kalyuzhny. "It is 
not feasible to raise the issue of setting up additional armed forces in the 
Caspian," he added at a recent meeting of the five Caspian littoral states in Baku, 
Azerbaijan. (ITAR-TASS, 26 Feb 03; BBC Monitoring, via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The Kazakhstan government, of course, disagrees. Of the five countries 
bordering the Caspian — Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Azerbaijan — 
only Kazakhstan does not possess any naval forces. Kazakhstan's senior deputy 
foreign minister, Kairat Abuseidov, explained his country’s intention as protection 
against the threat of terrorism, weapons and drug trafficking and illegal migration. 
"Establishment of small naval forces by Kazakhstan in the Caspian Sea will 
influence only the Kazakh territorial waters and will not be aimed against the 
countries of the region," he added. Unstated is the fact that Kazakhstan clearly 
has linked its future to the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian. The Kazakh 
armed forces already are oriented to protect the country's industrial 
infrastructure, largely oil-producing assets, in the western part of the country; this 
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spring large-scale military exercises in the Caspian Sea are planned. Solidifying 
Kazakhstan’s claim to Caspian resources is especially important considering the 
ongoing dispute between Iran and Azerbaijan over a portion of the southern part 
of the sea. (Russian Oil and Gas report, 26 Feb 03; What the Papers Say, via 
Lexis-Nexis) 
 
One can only question what threat Russia perceives from Kazakhstan's yet-to-
be-established navy. Are the vocal protests simply meant to mask the potential 
erosion of Moscow's ability to control its southern neighbors and the resources of 
the Caspian region? 
 
Ministry releases statistics on number of women in armed forces and holds 
beauty contest 
According to the defense ministry, Russia has approximately 93,000 women 
serving in its armed forces: Almost 4,000 of them are officers (300 are either 
colonels or lieutenant colonels and 800 are majors). The average age of female 
officers is 30. Overall, 72.5% serve in medical units, 7% are in the 
communication forces, 4.3% in the financial services and 2% are military 
interpreters. The remaining percentages were undisclosed. 
 
Russia has an armed force of approximately 1 million personnel including about 
330,000 conscripts. Women are not conscripted into the military but are allowed 
to volunteer. (MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS, 7 Mar 03; What the Papers Say, 
via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
 
In a conspicuously related event that underscores both the numbers above and 
how far Moscow has yet to go in modernizing its forces, Russia's military held a 
beauty contest recently. Female service members, representing ranks from 
private to captain, were encouraged to participate in the finals of the armed 
forces’ "Miss Shoulder-straps" contest. The event was held at the Russian army's 
central theater on 4-8 March. Sixteen winners from preliminary army and navy 
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competitions vied for the title. The program included a contest in general military 
skills and Russia's military history. Sponsors of the contest included the defense 
ministry, the Moscow government and other organizations. (ITAR-TASS, 28 Feb 
03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Nadezda Kinsky 
 
UKRAINE 
Reform and protests back on the agenda 
After a lengthy hiatus, the opposition has reawakened its Rise Up Ukraine 
campaign in time for spring. Even Victor Yushchenko called for unity among the 
opposition "at any price" at the 2 March Congress at which the opposition 
announced plans for a large protest on 9 March. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 3 Mar 03) 
 
Before the protest took place, President Leonid Kuchma in the Verkhovna Rada 
announced his plans for political reform in Ukraine, a subject he had begun 
discussing in November with the appointment of his new Prime Minister Viktor 
Yanukovich. The constitutional amendment to introduce a "parliamentary-
presidential model of government," which he submitted to the Rada on 6 March, 
proposes a bicameral system with a lower house of 300 representatives elected 
under a party-list system (the State Assembly) and an upper house with 81 
members (the House of Regions). Furthermore, Kuchma seeks presidential 
rights to dissolve the parliament and appoint the ("power") ministers for defense, 
internal affairs, foreign affairs and emergency situations. All other ministers, 
including the prime minister, would be appointed by the parliament. Elections 
would be held every five years according to the proposal, with parliamentary and 
presidential elections falling in the same year. 
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The opposition reacted negatively, saying that this reform was aimed at 
strengthening presidential power, extending Kuchma's term in power and further 
obfuscating the political system vis-à-vis a public already deeply mistrustful of 
politics in Ukraine. Kuchma said on 14 March that he wanted his reforms to be 
voted on — they would need a 300 majority in parliament in order to pass — 
while he was still in office, because he wanted the next president to be acting 
under the new system. "The head of state who will be elected in 2004 should run 
the country with a reformed political system, including with new powers," he said. 
(INTERFAX, 14 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0314, via World News Connection) 
 
The protests of 9 March, marking the birthday of the Ukrainian poet Taras 
Shevchenko, drew tens of thousands. The statement adopted at the rally covered 
many grievances concerning repression and low living standards, but also 
included a call for early presidential elections and political reform — presumably 
not the plan suggested by Kuchma himself. The tone of unification among the 
opposition forces is new and suggests a new resolve against the president. In 
contrast to earlier signals, the opposition leaders announced that they would be 
attempting to field a single common candidate in the upcoming presidential 
elections, underlining again the necessity to unite in opposition to the presidential 
forces. Yushchenko stated that anything but the choice of a single candidate "will 
be a defeat for all." (ITAR-TASS, 9 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0309, via World 
News Connection) Yuliya Tymoshenko later noted that this was the first of a 
series of ongoing protests, and that other actions, including a human chain 
across Ukraine, were being planned. 
 
Indeed, political reform is essential in Ukraine, where recent polls have displayed 
a dismally low level of trust in the political system and its representatives, 
institutions of authority and the media. Kuchma is most unlikely to be the right 
candidate for leading successful reforms, however; his popularity is remarkably 
low again at the moment. The issue probably will remain open until the 
presidential elections, which are the driving factor behind the sudden rush to 
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reform. The question that remains is whether Kuchma is trying to extend his own 
powers, or whether the reform — which actually reduces presidential power per 
se — is aimed at limiting a future adversary's power while securing his own 
immunity after his presidential term ends. With an eye to the presidential election, 
another important question to ask is whether the opposition can retain its current 
belief that unity is necessary for another one and a half years until the election, 
and back up this belief by unified action — and even a single candidate. 
 
BELARUS 
For a better life 
In Belarus, the protest mood has also risen, though less successfully so. The 
local elections held at the beginning of the month have been widely denounced 
as not meeting fair election standards, by, among others, the Belarusian Helsinki 
Committee, which called the elections "undemocratic" on 4 March, just days after 
they had been held. Complaints focused on inadequate funding, inconsistent 
treatment of candidates depending on what element they represented and 
reduced access for election observers. Cecilia Wigstrom of the Swedish Liberal 
Party, a member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly that just recently allowed 
Belarus to regain its seat, also spent the election period in Belarus and noted 
several "peculiarities." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 6 Mar 03) More recently, the 
Belarusian opposition complained that these elections had displayed even lower 
standards than were seen during voting in 2000 and 2001. The opposition parties 
had taken part in the local elections for the first time in five years, hoping to gain 
more influence, but this backfired judging by the election results. Partly due to the 
earlier boycotting strategy, but also to the divisiveness of the Belarusian 
opposition itself, the parties’ standing with the population does seem to be very 
low indeed. Despite the part played by the aforementioned electoral violations, 
the opposition certainly needs to raise its own profile with the population if it 
wants to become a more successful force in Belarus. Participation in this election 
may have been a first step. 
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Partly in response to complaints about electoral standards, as well as continuing 
grievances on issues of human rights and living standards in Belarus, the 
opposition and the human rights group Charter 97 called for a "march for a better 
life" to be held on 12 March. After initially refusing, the authorities finally granted 
permission for individuals to assemble but not to march. Amnesty International 
stated it would be keeping a close eye on the event and would consider any 
arrested participants to be prisoners of conscience. A number of persons were 
arrested after protesters decided to march without authorization. Four organizers 
from Charter 97 — Andrei Sannikov, Lyudmila Gryaznova, Dmitri Bondarenko 
and Leonid Malakhov — were sentenced to 15 days in jail on 13 March. 
(INTERFAX, 13 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0313, via World News Connection) An 
immediate response from Belarusian opposition and international organizations 
collected 70 signatures demanding their immediate release: "The severe 
sentences prove that the current authorities will give the Belarusian citizens 
neither freedom nor democracy, nor normal and decent lives ... It is evident that 
the authorities fear mass, well-organized, nonviolent protests." (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 19 Mar 03) The deputy chairman of the Belarusian People's Front, 
Yuri Khodyko, was detained on 17 March; administrative reasons delayed his 
sentencing, he went into hiding. However, despite the government’s 
overreaction, which points to some nervousness, the turnout for the 
demonstration (roughly 3,000 persons) appears unexpectedly and disturbingly 
low, as the Institute for War & Peace Reporting's Belarus Report contends. 
Although most in Belarus are unsatisfied with living conditions, surveys show that 
less than 20 percent are willing to protest rather than put up with or find other 
ways to deal with their situation. A stronger, more trusted and more visible 
opposition in the country might be able to change that. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
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CHECHNYA 
A way out of the quagmire? 
Some skeptics may say that the peace proposal presented by Ilyas Akhmadov, 
the foreign minister of Chechnya, at a press conference in Washington DC on 18 
March is a utopian dream and an academic exercise. Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine that the plan could be implemented in the current political context. 
However, every serious observer of the war expects hostilities to continue for 
years to come – long enough for political alignments and priorities to change 
substantially. In 1995 few would have expected Slobodan Milosevic to stand trial 
for genocide against the Bosnians or for the Baltic states to accede to NATO. 
 
"The Russian-Chechen Tragedy: The Way to Peace and Democracy," a 50-page 
document, represents the most elaborate and articulate statement of the 
aspirations of the Chechen resistance that has ever appeared. It contains a 
proposal for a peace process that would entail a temporary international 
trusteeship and eventual independence for Chechnya. (See text posted on the 
web page of the Chechen foreign ministry, www.chechnya-mfa.info/) 
 
The basic mechanism of the plan is that the Russian military would withdraw, to 
be replaced by international peacekeepers with a UN mandate to establish an 
international protectorate, deliver aid and oversee the demilitarization process 
(i.e., train the civil service, judiciary and military). With regard to Chechnya's 
status, the relevant passage states: "granting de jure statehood on completion of 
the international trusteeship term should be explicitly defined as a purpose of the 
trusteeship system, conditional on Chechnya’s transformation into a viable 
democratic state." In other words, if after a transitional period of several years 
Chechnya democratizes to the satisfaction of the international community, it will 
be automatically recognized then as an independent state. 
 
This represents a significant hardening of the official Chechen position on 
independence. For the last three years President Aslan Maskhadov and his 
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representatives have been calling for talks with no preconditions — leaving open 
the question of status. Moreover, Maskhadov's representatives had offered to 
begin negotiations on the basis of a compromise status within Russia on at least 
three occasions. Ivan Rybkin, the former secretary of the Security Council, said 
that he was approached in the Spring of 2000 by Ingush President Ruslan 
Aushev and North Ossetia's President Aleksandr Dzasokhov, acting as 
intermediaries, who wanted to explore the possibility of negotiating on the basis 
of a treaty drafted by Rybkin in 1997 and rejected by the Chechens at the time. 
Reportedly, at their meeting in the Moscow airport in November 2001, the 
Chechen president's representative, Akhmad Zakaev, handed a set of proposals 
to the Russian representative, General Viktor Kazantsev, which included the offer 
to negotiate a status within Russia. In July 2002 Zakaev repeated this offer to 
Rybkin at the informal talks in Liechtenstein. (CHECHNYA WEEKLY, 9 Sep 02, 
and Liz Fuller, RFE/RL CAUCUS REPORT, 29 Sep 02) 
 
Russia has persistently rejected all such offers. For well over three years of 
brutal war in Chechnya there have been no cease-fires or official negotiations. 
Naturally, as the number of Chechen dead grows, so does the determination to 
obtain full independence. 
 
The utter failure of the 1996 Khasavyurt peace has created a sense of 
hopelessness about Chechen independence among many in Russia and in 
Chechnya. Significantly the new peace plan acknowledges the failures of the 
1996-1999 Chechen government and addresses them. "The unruly, lawless 
situation in Chechnya between the two wars however understandable its causes, 
is clearly not what the Chechen people want and need. (…) Democracy is what 
the Chechens have fought for … " but have not experienced. If international 
donors and peacekeepers step in to alleviate the chaos and poverty reigning in 
Chechnya, many of the defects of the post-Khasavyurt Chechen Republic could 
be addressed. Most crucially, Akhmadov's proposal envisions that after a short 
initial period of cooperation with the international authorities, Maskhadov would 
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submit himself to elections. This provision should satisfy Maskhadov's staunchest 
critics. 
 
Finally, the document identifies specific measures that can be implemented 
immediately: 
 
• The US and EU countries should assign the issue of Chechnya top priority 
in their relations with Russia. 
• The UN secretary-general should designate a representative to promote a 
political resolution to the Russian-Chechen conflict. 
• Track two conferences should be undertaken by the International Crisis 
Group and the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels. 
• The Council of Europe should organize conferences of civil society 
leaders from Russia, Chechnya and Europe. 
• Parliamentary cooperation among the European Parliament, the 
parliaments of member countries, and the US Congress should be 
undertaken. To this end Ilyas Akhmadov conducted several meetings with 
US congressmen. 
 
In recent years the UN has had a surprisingly good record of rebuilding states 
such as East Timor and Cambodia. Over the same period, the post-17th-century 
Peace of Westphalia system, which established the principle of the territorial 
integrity of states, has been under assault, most notably in Yugoslavia, where 
Kosovo is expected to attain statehood after a period of international trusteeship. 
Additionally, US-endorsed peace plans for the Middle East hold out the prospect 
of a Palestinian state on the condition that the corrupt and repressive Palestinian 
Authority can transform itself into a democratic institution. Actually, the Chechens 
have stronger military, legal, historical and moral claims to independence than 
the Kosovars or the Palestinians: What they lack is a powerful international 
lobby, but that is changing. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Iraq, regional security and government structure 
The US-led operation in Iraq has forced Central Asia to prepare for the potential 
consequences of the war, including what a distraction from US interest in the 
region may mean in terms of economic assistance. Nonetheless, regional 
security relations continue to be negotiated and constitutional strictures continue 
to be modified. 
 
IRAQ 
In a recent press conference, Uzbek President Islam Karimov remarked, "we 
unequivocally support the US policy for resolving the Iraq problem." While the 
comments were made prior to military action being taken by the US, Karimov did 
make it clear that his country’s support extended to war without the support of the 
UN Security Council. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 12 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0312, via World News Connection) 
 
While Uzbekistan had been the only country in the region to support the US 
position openly (it is no coincidence that Uzbekistan is receiving more economic 
assistance from the US than ever before), Turkmenistan President Saparurat 
Niyazov, who previously had expressed neutrality, unexpectedly stated that "the 
Turkmenistan leadership supports Washington’s position on Iraq." 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 12 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0312, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Kazakhstan, however, was quick to express its concern for the failure of the UN 
Security Council to resolve the situation. (ITAR-TASS, 1514 GMT, 18 Mar 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0318, via World News Connection) Kazakh President Nursultan 
Nazarbaev reiterated his concern about the potential threat the war presented to 
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decreasing oil and gas prices — which could result in a destabilization of the 
Kazakh economy. (EURASIANET, 20 Mar 03; via www.eurasianet.org) 
Nonetheless, the Kazakh foreign ministry officially blamed Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein for the developments of the conflict. (INTERFAX-
KAZAKHSTAN, 1313 GMT, 15 Feb 03; via www.times.kg) 
 
Kyrgyzstan once again stated its concern for the situation (INTERFAX, 1111 
GMT, 19 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0319, via World News Connection), insisting 
that the allied airbases in Kyrgyzstan could be used only for combating terrorism 
in Afghanistan and for humanitarian shipments. (ITAR-TASS, 1004 GMT, 4 Mar 
03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0304, via World News Connection) Both Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan have taken steps to increase security out of fear that there may be a 
backlash by anti-American terrorist or militant groups. (MOSCOW TIMES, 24 Mar 
03; via www.times.kg) 
 
Tajikistan has been cautious in its statements about the war, expressing its 
hopes that civilian casualties be minimal. Tajik officials fear that the Iraq war may 
threaten further destabilization of Central Asia, but President Imomali 
Rakhmonov did not address the issue in his recent annual Nawruz speech to the 
country. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 24 Mar 03) 
 
REGIONAL SECURITY 
Although the war in Iraq looms ever-present in the minds of Central Asian 
government leaders, regional security issues remain their focus. Russia has 
stated that it will delay the transfer of attack planes, at least until June, from a 
Tajik air base to a new air base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan. (ITAR-TASS, 0832 GMT, 18 
Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0318, via World News Connection) The Kant air base 
(roughly 40 kilometers from the US air base in Kyrgyzstan) will have about 500 
troops and is scheduled to be functional in April. (ITAR-TASS, 1505 GMT, 14 
Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0314, via World News Connection) The transfer of the 
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planes from Dushanbe to Kant makes little strategic difference, but does send a 
strong political message about Russia’s presence in the region. 
 
Regarding the issue of borders, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have negotiated an 
agreement allowing residents of Barak, a 200-hectare Kyrgyz enclave located in 
Uzbekistan, free travel through Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan. (INTERFAX, 1820 
GMT, 13 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0313, via World News Connection) 
Uzbekistan had closed the borders, leading residents of Barak (a remnant of the 
Soviet National Delimitation Program of the 1920s) to ask Kyrgyz Prime Minister 
Nikolai Tanaev to negotiate travel rights for them or to resettle them onto Kyrgyz 
territory. (INTERFAX, 1205 GMT, 7 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0307, via World 
News Connection) 
 
While only 690 kilometers (out of 1490 km of shared border) have been delimited 
between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the opening of border posts allowing travel 
for Barak residents is a positive step towards resolving outstanding boundary 
issues. A further step towards improving those relations is Uzbek willingness to 
provide a map of the minefields along the border. The border was mined in 1999 
(in response to the incursion by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), but 
despite the six deaths, eleven injuries and multiple requests, Uzbekistan had 
been unwilling to provide location information to Kyrgyz officials. (ITAR-TASS, 
1745 GMT, 11 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0311, via World News Connection) 
 
Also of note for security in the region, 17 March marked the first anniversary of 
the Aksy riots in Kyrgyzstan in which six residents were killed and 40 injured. 
While the commemoration of the first anniversary of death is significant in the 
Islamic tradition, according to Kyrgyz Interior Minister Bakirdin Subanbekov, "no 
additional police forces [would] be sent to Aksy on 17 March." (INTERFAX, 0931 
GMT, 16 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0316, via World News Connection) Arguing 
that organizers were not properly registered, Kyrgyz officials did ban a 17 March 
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rally in Bishkek that was to mark the anniversary of the riots. (INTERFAX, 0958 
GMT, 17 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0317, via World News Connection) 
 
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 
Despite the banning of the rally in Bishkek, in his State of the Union address on 
12 March President Askar Akaev remarked that "democracy in Kyrgyzstan is 
acquiring more and more mature, developed forms, by reinforcing the attraction 
of values and connected to it and creating conditions for its deeper and wider 
expansion." (KABAR, 0000 GMT, 12 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0312, via World 
News Connection) Clearly there remains some distance between rhetoric of 
reform and practice. 
 
Turkmenistan, for example, announced in December 2002 that there would be 
elections to the Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) as well as to the Mejlis 
(parliament). The elections are scheduled for 6 April. But with just a few weeks 
before the election, the identity of the candidates and the exact number of seats 
up for election remain unknown. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 15 Mar 03) 
 
Meanwhile, in Tajikistan, a referendum on amendments to the constitution is 
scheduled for 22 June. The current referendum offers nearly 100 amendments to 
55 constitutional articles, one of which would allow President Rakhmonov to run 
for two more terms. (ITAR-TASS, 0933 GMT, 19 Mar 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0319, 
via World News Connection) The current constitution prohibits the president from 
running for reelection once the seven-year term ends. Rakhmonov’s current term 
is up in 2006; if the referendum passes it would give him the opportunity to rule 
until 2020. While the debate over the constitution ensues, the goal seems to be 
strengthening Rakhmonov’s control over the country and shifting blame for 
government shortcomings onto local officials. (EURASIANET, 17 Mar 03; via 
www.eurasianet.org) 
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